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Pakistan's fiscal deficit  remains high becauseof the government's
inability to mobilize new resources or to cut current expendi-
tures.  Yet, unlike other developing countries with high fiscal
deficits,  Pakistan has experienced neither  hyperinflation nor
debt rescheduling. This can be attributed to high growth and to
the availability of concessional external financing and domestic
nonbank borrowing.
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For almost 20 years, Pakistan's fiscal deficit - fairly rapid expansion of debt without recourse
at about 7 percent of GNP - averaged nearly  to inflationary finance.  Pakistan was also able to
twice the level for Asian countries as a whole.  borrow both domestically and abroad at below-
Although other countries with high fiscal deficits  market rates, including recycled petrodollars
-in  Latin America, for instance - have  from Middle East oil producers after 1973.
typically experienced serious growth, inflation,
and current account problems, Pakistan has not.  To gain additional insight into the rolc of
In recent years tlh  nflation rate has been 5  fiscal deficit in Pakistan, Haque and Montiel
percent, economic growth has averaged 7  analyze how alternative fiscal policies would
percent a year, and the current account has either  have affected the country's economic perfor-
been in surplus or registered manageable defi-  mance during the 1980s. They find that:
cits.
Reducing the deficit by cutting public
Haque and Montiel examine the causes of  expenditure could have had a favorable effect on
Pakistan's fiscal deficits.  As in many other  the trade balance, but at a cost to economic
countries, public enterprise investment spending  growth and with few price payoffs.
(financed by external development funds) during
the early to mid-1970s became a fixture of the  *  Increasing tax revenues could achieve a
economy, while sufficient revenues could not be  similar external adjustment while reducing the
generated through taxes or returns on public  output cost, but price problems might arise.
investments.  Public sector wages and salaries, as
well as higher defense spending in the late  o  Altering the composition of deficit financing
1970s, added to the burden.  But the most  would have predictable results - shifting to
important contribution to the fiscal deficits came  more money financing would mean higher
from public sector interest payments.  To keep  prices, lower interest rates, and higher growth.
inflation in check and to tap remittance flows,
Pakistan resorted to nonbank borrowing, but the  The authors conclude that f'inding alternative
rising stock of internal debt led to higher interest  modes of deficit financing will become more
rates, exacerbating the fiscal deficit.  urgent.  Not only will continued concessional
financing depend on the vagaries of the world oil
The authors also examine why, despite these  market, but the accumulation of domestic debt
deficits, the country's  macroeconomic perfor-  and the;  higher cost of borrowing at home will
mance has been surprisingly good.  The equilib-  require lower primary deficits.  But they warn
rium deficit is estimated to have been quite high  that if Pakistan turns to money financing, its
for Pakistan in recent years (about 5.5 percent of  macroeconomic perfomiance would likely begin
GNP), despite a low inflation rate, because of a  to resemble that of other high-deficit developing
very high underlying rate of growth of real  countries.
output (about 6 percent a year). This allowed a
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As in  many other  developing  economies,  the  fiscal  deficit  has  been
perceived  as a continuing  problem  in  Pakistan. The  authorities  have made
repeated  attqmpts,  including  the  undertaking  of several  adjustment  programs,
to  deal  with fiscal  imbalances  over the  past two  decades,  but  have only
achieved  temporary  success-s. The  deficit  of the  federal  and  provincial
governments  has  averaged  about  6 1/2  porcent  of GNP  during  the  eighties,  and
was about  7 1/2  percent  in the  fiscal  year  1987/88,  the  most recent  year
included  in this  study. As in  many developing  economies,  the  deficit
remains  high because  of the  political  and  administrative  inability  of the  ,
government  to mobilize  additional  resources  or to cut  current  expenditures.
Weaknesses  in the tax  system  have led  to  an inelastic  tax  structure  and  a
heavy reliance  on trade  taxes  for  revenues. Moreover,  with defense
expenditures  constituting  about  25 percent  of expenditures,  intertest
payments  another  15 percent,  and  administration  (including  social  services)
another  15  percent,  the  structure  of expenditures  is  not  amenable  to large
cuts.  The  burden  of expenditure  cuts,  therefore,  falls  on development
expenditure  at the  cost of much-needed  infrastructure.
In spite  of these  similarities  with  conditions  elsewhere,  the
macroeconomic  consequences  of fiscal  deficits  in  Pakistan  have apparently
been quite  dissimilar  from  those  in other  developing  countries  with fiscal
deficits  of comparable  magnitude. Specifically,  Pakistan  has experienced
neither  hyperinflation  nor  debt rescheduling.  As measured  by the  official
figures,  growth  has remained  quite  strong  through  the last  two  decadns,
inflation  has not  been high,  and the  current  account  deficit  has  averaged2-
about  2 1/2  percent  of GNP,  remaining  largely  financeable  and  not  posing
debt servicing  problems  for  the  country.
For this  reas,.an,  Pakistan  presents  an interesting  contrast  to some  of
the  other  countries  in this  study. This  chapter  will focus  on the  reasons
why Pakistan's  extremely  high fiscal  deficits  have  proven  to be relatively
benign--at  least  in comparison  with the  experience  of, say,  several  Latin
American  countries. The chapter  is  divided  into  six  parts:  the  first
section  presents  a brief  overview  of macroeconomic  developments  in Pakistan
over the  last  two  decades. This is followed  by a  raore  detailed  look  at
fiscal  developments  intended  to address  the  question  o£~  why fiscal  deficits
have remained  consistently  high.  The  macroeconomic  consequences  of these
deficits  are  examined  in  the  next three  sections,  which in turn  describe
"equilibrium"  deficit  calculations,  estimates  of the  effects  of fiscal
policy  variables  on structural  macroeconomic  relationships  in Pakistan,  and
counterfactual  simulations  of alternative  historical  fiscal  policies.
chapter's  main conclusions  are  presented  in  the  last section.
I.  Macro.jconomic  Developments  in Pakistan--An  Overview
As indicated  above,  the  distinguishing  feature  of Pakistan's  recent
macroeconomic  history  is that,  in  spite  of the  presence  of fiscal  deficits
that  are  very high  by international  standards,  the  country's  macroeconomic
performance  has been relatively  good.  This is  not to say,  of course,  that
fiscal  deficits  of the  magnitudes  observed  have not  had  harmful  effects,  or
that  performance  could  not  have  been improved  with lower  deficits,  but
rather  that there  is no evidence  in  Pakistan  of the  chronic  acute
macroeconomic  crises--manifest  in  extended  periods  of negative  per  capitaincome  growth,  'lyperinflation,  and inability  to service  external  debt-ehat
have characterized  many other  developing  countries  with comparable  fiscal
performance.
This  can be readily  documented  by a  brief  overview  of Pakistan's  recent
macroeconomic  performance,  focusing  on a  small  number  of key  variables.
Figure  1  describes  the  behavior  of the  overall  deficit  of the  consolidate
federal  and  provincial  governments  of Pakistan,  expressed  as a fraction  of
GNP.  I/  As this  figure  illustrates,  the  deficit  has remained  very high
over the  entire  period  spanning  nearly  two  decades,  with the  average  deficit
amounting  to about  7  percent  of  GNP over  the  entire  1972-88  period.
Although  some  fiscal  adjustment  was achieved  during  1)78-81,  when the
extremely  hign deficits  of the  1974-78  period  were nearly  cut in  half,  the
fiscal  deficit  has been  on a rising  trend  during  most of the  decade  of the
eighties. Over these  years,  Pakistan's  fiscal  deficit  averaged  nearly  twice
that  of  Asian  countries  as a group,  according  to the  IMF's  World  Economic
Outlook  (1990).
In  contrast  to this  fiscal  performarre,  Figure  2  presents  the
inflation-output  outcomes  over  the  same  period  of time.  The top  panel  of
this  figure  demonstrates  that,  whether  measured  by the  CPI, the  WPI, or
the  GDP deflator,  inflation  performance  in Pakistan  appears  to  have been
remarkably  good.  The  peak inflation  rate  during  this  period  came in
I/  This is  the  broadest  deficit  measure  available  for  Pakistan  and  will
bb used throughout  the  study. Because  of the  importance  of  workers'
remittances  in this  country's  economy  GNP, rather  than  GDP,  will be used
as the  scale  variable.Figure  I
Consolidated Deficit of  the  Federal & Provincial  Governments
1972-73 to  1987-88
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Figure  2b.  Rate  of Growth  of GDP, 1972-73 to  1987-88
Figure  2c.  Real GNP Per  Capita,  1972-73 to  1987-88
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1973-74,  amounting  to 33  percent  (as  measured  by the  GDP deflator),  aed
after  1976  the inflation  rate  averaged  less  than  10  percent  per  year,
converging  in recent  years  to  about  5  percent. At the  same  time,  economic
growth  has been robust  (Panel  B),  averaging  more than 7  p rcent  during  the
eighties,  and  never  falling  below  3 percent  per  year over the  entire  1972.87
period. As a result,  real  GNP  per  capita  has exhibited  a continuously
rising  trend  during  this  time (Panel  C),  with a cumulative  increase  of about
60  percent.  1/
Turning  to the  external  sector,  Panel  A of Figure  3 depicts  the  current
account/GNP  ratio. After  a peak  deficit  of over  8 percent  of GNP in
1974-75,  Pakistan  achieved  a substantial  current  account  adjustment,
registering  a small  surplus  by 1982-83. While  the  country  benefitted  during
this  period  from  a substantial  increase  in  external  receipts  in the  form  of
worker's  remittances  (primarily  from  ;  distani  workers  employed  in  Middle
Eastern  oil-exporting  countries),  it is  noteworthy  that this  boon
contributed  to current  account  adjustment,  rather  than  to an import  binge.
Expressed  as a proportion  of exports  of goods  and  non-factor  services,
Pakistan's  external  debt  service  ratio  remained  at the  relatively  low  value
(even  by Asian  standards)  of about  17 1/2  percent  up to about  1981-82  (see
Panel  B of Figure  3).  Expresz-d  in  proportion  to a  more relevant  measure--
J/  To some  extent  the  official  price-output  figures  could  be misleading.
The quality  of the  output  data is  open to question,  particularly  in the
presence  of what is  said to  be a substantial  underground  economy. The
consumer  price  index,  on the  other  hand,  encompasses  a nuw'er  of goods  which
have  been subjected  to  price  controls  for  some time. While  this  may  be part
of the  story,  however,  data  problems  are  unlikely  to account  for  more than  a
very  minor  part  of the  discrepancy  between  the  macroeconomic  performance  of
Pakistan  and  that  of, say,  several  large  countries  in Latin  America.-7-
Figure 3a.  Ratio of Current Account to  GNP, 1972-73 to  1987-88
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Figure 3b.  Debt Service Ratio,  1972-73  to  1987-88
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exports  of  goods  and  services  (i.e.,  Lncluding  remittances),  the  average
debt  service  ratlo  for  the  same  reriod  is substantially  lower  (about  12
percent).  This  reflects  not  only  the  previously  mentloned  .urrent  account
adjustment,  but  also  Paklstan's  access  to  external  funds  at  concessional
rates.
After  1981-82,  however,  Pakistan's  debt  service  ratlo  lncreased
sharply,  with  the  higher  measure  stabilizing  at  about  23  percent  of  exports
of  &oods  and  nonfactor  services  after  1983-84.  As  shall  be  shown  below,
this  reflects  a  shift  in  the  composltlon  of  external  financlng  toward
increased  borrowing  at  market  rates.
A final  notable  feature  of  Pakistan's  macroeconomic  performance  over
the  past  two  decades  concerns  the  rather  unusual  behavior  of  national  saving
and  investment.  These  variables,  expressed  in  proportion  to  GNP,  are
plotted  in  Panel  A  of  Figure  4. In  spite  of  a substantial  increase  in
saving  and  Investment  rates  over  the  1974-76  period,  levels  of  saving  and
investment  in  Pakistan  have  been  rather  low,  not  only  by  developing-country
standards,  but  also  in  view  of  the  country's  high  growth  rate. The
implication  is,  of  course,  that  measured  incremental  capLtaL-cutput  ratios
(ICOR's)  have  been  remarkably  low  (Panel  B  of  Figure  4).
II. Fiscal  Policy  in  Pakistan
The  origin  of  fiscal  deficits  in  Pakistan  is  in  menv  ways  not
dissimilar  to  that  in  other  developing  countries.  In  brief,  an  upsurge
of  externally  financed  development  spending  during  the  early  to  mid
seventies,  primarily  in  the  form  of  investment  by  public  enterprises,  proved
to  be  relatively  permanent,  and  the  public  sector  w6s  unable  to  generate  the-9-
Figure  4a.  National  Saving  and  Investment,  1972-73 to  1987-88
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revenues--either  through  taxation  or  from  the  direct  return  to  the
investments  undertaken--to  close  the  fiscal  gap  thereby  created.
For the  purposes  of this  section,  it is  useful  to  split  the  description
of fiscal  policy  in Pakistan  into  two  subperiods,  encompassing  the  period  of
democratic  rule  under  the  Bhutto  government  (1972-73  to 1976-77)  and the
subsequent  martial  law  government  (1977-78  to 1987-88). The Bhutto  govern-
ment took  power  after  the  1971  war  with India  and  separation  of Bangladesh.
It  saw its  mandate  as the  rapid  economic  and social  development  of the
former  West Pakistan  and  was given  a strong  impetus  in this  direction  by
the  combination  of military  defeat  and  plentiful  external  financing  at
concessional  terms,  primarily  from  Middle  Eastern  oil  producers  which  at
t`at  time  were reaping  the  windfalls  of the  first  oil  price  shock.
To  an extenc  that is  difficult  to  quantify,  spending  during  these  years
was influenced  by factors  such  as flood  relief  and the  attempt  to  provide  a
countercyclical  offset  to the  negative  output  effects  of the  oil price  shock
(Pakistan  is a  net oil importer). However,  in  view of the  circumstances
described  above,  the  bulk of the  spending  increase  from  18 percent  of  GNP in
1972-73  to 24 percent  in 1975-76  (Table  1)  must  be understood  as the  result
of a conscious  policy  choice--i.e.,  as an explicit  intention  of fiscal
policy. During  these  years,  development  expenditures--consisting  of
investment  by the federal  and  provincial  governments,  capital  transfers  to
local  governments  and  state  enterprises,  as well as production  subsidies--
more than  doubled  their  share  of GNP.  Public  sector  investment  was devoted
to the  development  of the  chemical  industry,  as  well as to  cement,
fertilizers,  engineering,  petroleum,  steel,  and  vegetable  ghee.  This  periodTable 1.  Pakistan:  Cansolidated Accounts of  the  Federsl
uix  Provincial  Governnents  1972-73 to  1987-88
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also saw  the  nationalization  of the  seven  major  manufacturing  and  industrial
groups,  as well  as of banking,  insurance,  shipping  and educational  insti-
tutions. Within  the  category  of current  expenditures,  a rapid  expansion
took  place  in the  scale  of subsidies  (classified  as 'other"  current
expenditure  in Table  1).  These  increased  by an average  annual  rate  of 39
percent  in the  first  half of the  seventies. The  principal  subsidy  over the
period  was on latta"  (whole  wheat  flour)  which  was distributed  at ration
depots,  primarily  in urban  areas,  at prices  below  those  required  to cover
the  cost  of wheat  imports. By the  mid-seventies,  therefore,  the  public
sector  had a significantly  larger  role in  Pakistan  than it  had  at the
beginning  of the  decade.
Unfortunately,  this  expansion  of the  role  of the  public  sector  was not
matched  by an  offsetting  rise in  revenues. In fact,  though  expenditures  of
the  federal  and  provincial  governments  increased  by more than  6 percent  of
GNP from 1972-73  to 1975-76,  total  revenues  increased  by only  one  percent .
of GNP during  the  same  period,  owing  primarily  to an increase  in domestic
indirect  taxes  (Table  1). 1/ The  result,  of course,  was an increase  in
the  fiscal  deficit  amounting  to about  5 percent  of GNP.  Since  foreign  loans
were plentiful  and  available  at favorable  terms,  almost  three  quarters  of
the  deficit  financing  during  these  years  was  external.
The  martial  law  government  which  assumed  office  in  July of 1977
initiated  a short-term  stabilization  program  supported  by an IMF  standby
L/ Indirect  taxes  account  for  about  80  percent  of total  tax  revenues  In
Pakistan,  and foreign  trade  taxes  represent  about  half of total  indirect  tax
revenue. Administrative  problems  hayo  hampered  the  collection  of direct
taxes,  and the  taxation  of agricultural  incomes  has not  been  politically
feasible.- 13 -
program. This  program  attempted  to address  some  of the  structural  problems
embedded  in the  economy  as  well as to  correct  perceived  financial
imbalances,  the  most important  of which  was the  fiscal  deficit. An
important  goal  of the  new government  was to  deemphasize  the  role  of the
public  sector  in the  economy. This change  in regimes  coincided  with an
external  shock--the  sharp  curtailment  of financial  assistance  from  the
United  States  because  of Pakistan's  nuclear  program--and  these  developments
ushered  in  a period  of relative  fiscal  retrenchment.  During  the  period
1976-77  to 1980-81,  the  fiscal  deficit  fell from  over 8 percent  of GNP to
under  5  percent.
The fiscal  improvement  during  this  period  took the  form  of both
expenditure  cuts and  revenue  increases. The spending  reductions  can safely
Le  treated  as exogenous  policy  measures,  since  they  represented  an avowed
policy  goal  of the  new  government. Moreover,  the  bulk of the  spending  cuts
(more  than  one  percent  of GNP)  occurred  in  development  spending,  consistent
with the  government's  explicit  goal  of curtailing  public  involvement  in
productive  activities  and leaving  these  to the  private  sector. While  an
effort  was also  made to  reduce  current  expenditures,  this  attempt  met  with
limited  success,  as spending  of this  type  contracted  by only about  1/2  of
one percent  of GNP over  the  course  of this  period.  1/
The total  contribution  of revenue  increases  to the  fiscal  adjustment
(amounting  to  2 percent  of GNP) exceeded  that  of spending  cuts  over this
period. However,  though  there  was a serious  effort  to improve  tax
1J/  The  previous  government,  however,  had  already  achieved  a substantial
reduction  in  public  consumption  during  its  last  year in  office.- 14  -
administration,  only about  half  of the  revenue  increase  appears  to  have  been
the  result  of exogenous  fiscal  policy  measures. To assess  the  extent  to
which  discretionary  revenue  measures  may have  contributed  to  the fiscal
adjustment,  in  Table  2 we report  the  results  of very simple  regressions  that
relate  the three  components  of total  tax  revenue  (direct  taxes,  taxes  on
international  trade,  and other  indirect  taxes)  to their  primary  determinants
(all  in log  form).  In the  case  of direct  taxes  and other  indirect  taxes  we
took this  to  be the  tax  base,  proxied  by nominal  GNP,  while  for trade  taxes
these  determinants  consisted  of the  tax  base in the form  of exports  and
imports,  as  well as the  share  of  workers'  remittances  in  GNP. J/  The
latter  variable  greatly  improves  the  fit  of the  regression. We take it  as a
proxy  for the  composition  of imports,  on the  hypothesis  that  an increase  in
remittances  increases  the  share  in total  imports  of dutiable  imports  such  as
consumer  durables.
These  simple  regressions  account  for  almost  all of the  variation  in tax
receipts. Taking  their  residuals  as  measures  of discretionary  tax  changes,
total  discretionary  tax  measures  account  for  about  5 1/2  percent  of total
tax  receipts  in 1979-80  and  about  7 1/2  percent  in 1980-81  and 1981-82
respectively. At their  peak,  these  discretionary  revenue  increases  amounted
to slightly  less than  one  percent  of  GNP.  The  remainder  of the  increase  in
tax  revenues  is accounted  for  by an increase  in trade  taxes,  as  both exports
and imports  rose rapidly  during  these  years. A real  exchange  rate
1J/  Since  the  coefficient  of log  GNP in  equation  (2)  is essentially  unity,
this  equation  in effect  regresses  the  share  of trade  taxes  in GNP  on the
share  of exports  and imports  in  GNP as  well as on the share  of remittances
in  GNP.- 15 
Table  2.  Determinants  of Tax  Revenues  j
(3)
(1)  (2)  Other
Direct  rrade  Indirect
Taxes  Taxes  Taxes
Constant  -3.72  -0.47  -1.93
(0.59)  (0.62)  (0.62)
GNP  0.98  0.93  0.92
(0.05)  (0.03)  (0.05)








R2  0.97  0.99  0.99
1/  All variables  (except  the  inflation  rate)  are in log  form.  The data
are annual,  and  the  regressions  are  estimated  for  the  period  1972-73  to
1987-88.- 16  -
depreciation  fueled  by the  depreciation  of the  US dollar  against  the
currencies  of Pakistan's  trading  partners  in the  late  seventies  gave  a  boost
to exports,  while  a substantial  increase  in  remittances  as a consequence  of
the  second  oil shock  gave rise to  an import  boom  at the  end  of the
seventies.
Improvements  in the fiscal  stance,  however,  did  not  prove  to be
permanent. After  1981-82,  the fiscal  deficit  began to increase  once  again,
reaching  8 1/2  percent  of  GNP  by 1986-87,  a level  comparable  to those  of the
mid-seventies. While  there  were a number  of changes  in the  composition  of
revenues  during  this  period--slippage  in the  collection  of direct  taxes  and
of  domestic  indirect  taxes  tended  to  be offset  by increasing  nontax  revenues
(primarily  in the  form  of profits  on the  distribution  of oil  products)  1/-
-the  share  of public  sector  revenue  in  GNP showed  no trend.  Instead,  the
increase  in the  deficit  arose  from  the  expenditure  side.
This was so in spite  of a continued  contraction  in the  share  of
development  expenditures  in  GNP.  This type  of spending,  which  had peaked
at 9 3/4  percent  of GNP in 1976-77,  had fallen  to 8 1/2  percent  by 1980-81
and was  6  3/4  percent  by 1987-88. The increase  in spending  instead  took the
form  of higher  public  consumption  (in  the  form  of public  sector  wages  and
salaries  and  defense  spending)  as  well as of larger  interest  payments.
Defense  spending,  which  had amounted  to 21 percent  of total  public  expen-
ditures  in 1978-79,  had increased  its  share  to 27 percent  by 1984-85.  2/
1/ These  show  up as "other  nontax  revenues"  in  Taule 1.
2/  See  Kemal (1987).- 17  -
By far  the  most rapidly-increasing  category  of spending  during  the
eighties,  however,  has  been total  public  sect^r  interest  payments. This
reflects  a conscious  change  in the  composition  of deficit  financing  after
1980-81. In an effort  to keep inflation  in check  and to tap  directly  what
was  perceived  to  be a plentiful  supply  of private  saving  originating  with
remittance  inflows,  the  government  of Pakistan  limited  its  borrowing  from
the  domestic  banking  system  after  1980-81  and  domestic  nonbank  borrowing
became  the  residual  source  of finance. When the  international  debt  crisis
curtailed  the  availability  of external  funds  in  1981-82,  such  funds  were
also replaced  by domestic  nonbank  borrowing. Thus the  combination  of an
aversion  to inflationary  finance,  reduced  availability  of external  funds,
and increased  public  consumption,  resulted  in  a substantial  increase  in
domestic  nonbank  borrowing. As shall  be shown  later,  the  rising  stock  of
internal  debt could  be absorbed  domestically  only  by offering  higher
interest  rates,  and  the  combination  of higher  debt  stock  and  increasing
interest  rates  caused  interest  payments  to  mount  over time. Total  public
sector  interest  payments,  which  had  amounted  to 2 percent  of GNP in 1980-81,
had almost  doubled  as a  percent  of GNP  by 1987-88,  thereby  accounting  for
about  two-thirds  of the  increase  in the  deficit  to  GNP ratio  over this  time.
For  any  given  year, therefore,  this  component  of the  deficit  increase
reflected  past financing  decisions,  rather  than  current  policy.
In sum, the  upsurge  in fiscal  deficits  in Pakistan  during  the  eighties
was the result  of two  policy  choices:
a.  An increase  in  public  consumption  in the  face  of a  political
inability  to raise  commensurate  revenues.- 18  -
b.  A change  in the financing  mix from  domestic  bank and  external
financing  to domestic  nonbank  borrowing. This  was partly  dictated  by
reduced  availability  of external  funds,  but  was largely  the  outcome  of a
policy  choice  to curtail  bank financing.
III. 22ficits  and  Inflation  in Pakistan
As indicated  previously,  Pakistan  has  operated  for  the  better  part of
two  decades  with fiscal  deficits  that  are  quite  large  by international
standards  in relal'i,n  to  GDP.  In other  developing  countries,  fiscal
deficits  of smaller  magnitude  have been  blamed  for  a  number  of adverse
macroeconomic  developments,  chief  among  them  being  a  high rate  of inflatior.
By contrast,  as indicated  earlier,  Pakistan  has  performed  relatively  well
in a  macroeconomic  sense,  with  a high average  rate  of economic  growth,  low
inflation,  and  a relative  absence  of major  external  imbalances.  The key
questions  that  arise  in connection  with fiscal  policy  in Pakistan  are  thus
the  following: What macroeconomic  effects  have sustained  high fiscal
deficits  exerted  on the Pakistani  economy? And  more specifically,  why have
high deficits  not  been associated  with inflation  of Latin  American
proportions  in  Pakistan?
These  two  questions  will  be addressed  in  reverse  order  in this  section
and the  one that  follows. The link (or  lack  thereof)  between  deficits  and
inflation  in  Pakistan  is  explored  in this  section,  which is  divided  into  two
parts:  first,  we explore  the  theoretical  links  between  deficits  and
inflation. Second,  we apply  this  discussion  to the  case of Pakistan. The
more general  discussion  of the  macroeconomic  effects  of fiscal  deficits  in
Pakistan  is  postponed  to the following  section.- 19  -
1.  eficits  and  Xnfltio
In  popular  discussions,  the link  between  deficits  and  inflation  in
developing  countries  is  quite  direct. In the  absence  of secondary
securities  markets,  open-market  operations  are  not an important  monetary
policy  tool in  such  countries. Since  government  borrowing  from the  central
bank expands  the  supply  of base  money,  the  rate  of growth  of the  money
supply  is taken  to  depend  primarily  on the  size  of the fiscal  deficit. With
the rate  of inflation  in turn  being  determined  by the  rate  of growth  of the
money  supply,  the link  between  deficits  and inflation  follows.
In realitv,  however,  matters  are  much  more complicated  than  this,  for  a
number  of reasons. First,  the  link  between  money  growth  and inflation  is
not as tight  as the  foregoing  suggests. Not  only does the  real  demand  for
money  increase  with  output  growth,  providing  a non-inflationary  source  of
seignorage,  but velocity  is  subject  to secular,  cyclical,  and  other
movements,  weakening  the link  between  money  growth  and inflation  during  any
given  short  period. Thus,  this  link  can  be expected  to hold only  as a  long-
run regularity.
Second,  while secondary  securities  markets  are indeed  absent  in many
developing  countries,  primary  markets  in  which  the  nonfinancial  public
sector  can  borrow  directly  from  the  private  sector  exist  in  most countries--
including  Pakistan. Moreover,  the  public  sector  also  has recourse  to
external  financing. Thus,  the  link  between  fiscal  deficits  and growth  of
base  money  through  central  bank financing  is itself  an imperfect  one.  1/
I/  Nonetheless,  as  will be explained  below,  there  are indeed  limits  to
(domestic  and  external)  debt issuance  as a source  of deficit  financing.- 20  -
Third,  a  proper  assessment  of the  effects  of defLcits  on money  growth
requires  the  consolidation  of the  central  bank  with the  nonflnancial  public
sector. Central  bank financing  of government  spending  on imports  does  not
create  base  money,  for  example,  while  both external  financing  of domestic
government  speniding  and  central  bank lending  to commercial  banks  do.  Thus,
accounting  for  the  growth  of base  money  requires  considering  the  behavior  of
the  nonfinancial  public  sector  and that  of the  central  bank together. The
conventional  fiscal  deficit  by itself  may therefore  be a  poor indicator  of
the inflationary  pressures  created  by the  growth  of base  money.
Finally,  the  exchange-rate  regime  must  be taken  into  account  in
assessing  the  link  between  fiscal  deficits  and the  growth  of base money.
Under  fixed  exchange  rates,  a fiscal  deficit-induced  expansion  of base money
may  be offset  by a private  capital  outflow  which  draws  down foreign  exchange
reserves. In this  case,  what is intended  as  money financing  becomes  in
effect  external  financing  of the  deficit.
All of this  being  said,  there  is  nevertheless  a valid  long-run
relationship  between  fiscal  deficits  and inflation. This  relationship
emerges  from the  public  sector's  solvency  constraint. This is easiest  to
show formally.  j/  Let  b denote  the  public  sector's  (including  the  central
bank)  real  stock  of debt to the  domestic  private  sector,  KG the  public
sector's  capital  stock,  FG  public  external  debt,  d the  real  primary  fiscal
deficit,  and  m the  real stock  of base money,  all  measured  as ratios  to GNP.
Also,  let rB  denote  the  real interest  rate  on domestic  borrowing,  rK the  net
real (pecuniary)  rate  of return  on public  investment,  rF the  real interest
;/  The discussion  that  follows  draws  heavily  on Bulter  (1986).- 21 -
rate  pairl  on  foreign  debt,  r*  the  real  interest  rate  prevailing  in  inter-
national  capital  markets  (external  lnterest  rate  plus  rate  of  depreciation
less  domestic  inflation),  n the  rate  of  growth  of  real  GNP,  and  s  the
nominal  exchange  rate. The  public  sector's  budget  constraint  can  then  be
written:
*  *  *  0
(1) b +  sfG  +  m  - k  d - (rk  - n)KG  +  (rB  - n)  b +  (rF  +  s - n)  sfG
- (w  + n)  m,
where  w is  the  rate  of  inflation.  1/  This  can  be transformed  into:
*  0  S  - S
(2)  b + sfG -kG-  d +  (r*  - n)(b  + sfG - kG) - [m  + (w + n)m
A*
where  d - d + (rB - r*)b  + (rF  + s - r*)sfG  + (r*  - rK)  kG is the 'adjusted"
primary  deficit--i.e.,  the  primary  deficit  plus  the  excess  interest  paid  on
domestic  debt  and  foreign  debt  over  that  prevailing  in  international  capital
markets  plus  the  shortfall  in  the  return  on  the  public  capital  stock
relative  to  the  external  interest  rate.
The  initial  net  worth  of  the  public  sector  is  given  by (kG  - b - sfG),
and  the  public  sector  will  be  solvent  if  the  present  value  (using  the
growth-corrected  interest  rate  r*  - n)  of  its  anticipated  future  debt
service  is  at  least  equal  to  its  net  debt,  i.e.:
(3)  PV (m  +  (w  +  n) m - d) a  b  +  sfG - kG
lJl  A  dot  (.)  over  a  variable  denotes  a  time  derivative,  whereas  a  hat
(  )  denotes  a  proportional  rate  of  change.- 22  -
The resources  available  to  the  public  sector  to service  debt  consist  of
future  seignorage  revenue,  given  by a +  (w  +  n)m,  and future  'adjusted"
primary  surpluses,  given  by - a.  Notice  that,  other  things  equal,  an
increase  in the  present  value  of the  stream  of future  deficits  requires  an
increase  in the  present  value  of the inflation  tax  sm.  It is in this
present-value  sense  that  higher  fiscal  deficits  are related  to higher
inflation.
Notice  also  that  a number  of factors  influence  the  present  value  of the
inflation  tax  associated  with  a given  path  of the  primary  deficit. The
following  observations  are  germane:
a.  The  relevant  value  of the  primary  deficit  is the "adjusted"
deficit--i.e.,  that  which  takes  account  of differences  between  the interest
rate  on domestic  borrowing,  the  marginal  product  of public  capital,  and the
actual  interest  paid on external  borrowing,  on the  one  hand,  and the
marginal  cost of exterr,al  funds,  on the  other. Access  to  domestic  or
external  funds  at favorable  rates,  or particularly  productive  public
capital,  reduces  the  present  value  of the  inflation  tax  associated  with a
given  unadjusted  deficit.
b.  The  amount  of seignorage  required  to  finance  a given  path of the
adjusted  deficit  is smaller  the  smaller  the  initial  net stock  of debt.
c.  Given  the  amount  of seignorage  required,  the  requisite  inflation
tax is  smaller  the larger  the  rates  of growth  of output  and the  greater  the
secular  growth  in the  money-income  ratio.- 23 -
2.  ADRlication  to Pakista
The  foregoing  discussion  can  be applied  to the Pakistani  experience.
During  the  eighties,  the  consolidated  deficit  of the federal  and  provincial
governments  has averaged  about  6 1/2  percent  of GNP (see  Table  1).  Since
the  1980  stock  of base money  amounted  to about  12 percent  of GNP, financing
of this  deficit  solely  through  the  issuance  of  base money  would  have implied
an inflation  rate in excess  of 54  percent  per  year during  the  eighties,  even
before  allowing  for  erosion  of the  monetary  base through  increased  velocity.
After  allowing  for  such  erosion,  reliance  on the  inflation  tax  to finance
a deficit  of this  magnitude  would imply  inflation  rates  of Latin  American
proportions. The  actual  growth  of base  money  and  domestic  prices  (measured
by the  GDP deflator)  in Pakistan  are  depicted  in  Figure  5.  Evidently,  both
base  money  growth  and the  domestic  inflation  rate  have fallen  substantially
short  of what the  simple  analysis  would  predict. The observations  of the
previous  subsection  can  be used to explain  why.
Rearranging  equation  (2)  permits  us to  write:
0  0  0 
(4)  b +  sfG  +  m - d - [(w  +  n)(b  +  SfG  + m) - SsfG],
where  d - d +  (rB  +  *)b  +  (rF  +  *)SfG  +  kG is the  conventional  deficit/GNP
ratio. The  expression  on the  right-hand  side  of (4)  is the  inflation  and
growth-adjusted  deficit  ratio--i.e.,  the  actual  deficit  minus  the  portion
that  can  be financed  without  altering  the  proportion  of total  debt to GNP.
When the  value  of this  expression  is zero,  the  conventional  deficit  can  beFigure 5
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accommodated  without  requiring  macroeconomic  adjustments--including  in the
rate  of inflation--because  the  requisite  amount  of financing  will presumaoly
be forthcoming. In other  words, ((*  + n)(b + s  +  ) - ssf 0J is  the
deficit  ratio  that is  consistent  with  macroeconomic  equilibrium  with
inflation  rate f  and  real  growth  rate  n.  Panel  A of Figure  6 depicts  the
actual  (DEF)  and 'equilibrium'  (denoted  EQDEF)  deficit  ratios  for  Pakistan
in the  years 1980-87,  using  smoothed  values  of the  growth  rate  n, and  the
rate of inflation  w,  and  setting  the  rate  of exchange  rate  depreciation
equal  to w  to  calculate  EQDEF. As this  figure  shows,  the  equilibrium
deficit  was  indeed  at a relatively  high  value  for  Pakistan  during  this
period  (about  5 1/2  percent  of GNP  on the  average)  in spite  of an inflation
rate (for  the  GDP  deflator)  averaging  a little  over 7  percent. This is
primarily  attributable  to a very  high  rate  of growth  of real  output  (about  6
percent  per year),  which  permits  a fairly  rapid  expansion  of both interest-
bearing  and  non-interest-bearing  debt  without  recourse  to inflationary
finance.
The actual  deficit/GNP  ratio  fell  below this  equilibrium  value  for  the
first  two  years  of this  period  (Panel  A of Figure  6).  For  the  remainder  of
the  period,  the  deficit  averaged  about  7  percent  of GNP.  Thus  the 'excess
deficit"--i.e.,  that  portion  of the  deficit  not  compatible  with  macro-
economic  equilibrium  at the  average  inflation  and growth  rates  of the  1980-
81 to 1987-88  period--amounted  to about  1  1/2  percent  of GNP.  It is  not
surprising,  therefore,  that,  as indicated  in  Panel  B of Figure  6, the  ratio
of the liabilities  of the  consolidated  public  sector  of Pakistan  (consisting
of base money,  domestic  debt,  and  external  debt)  to GNP  was fairly  stable- 26  -
Figure Oa
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Figure  6b
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for  the  first  half of the  eighties,  in spite  of a fiscal  deficit  amounting
to almost  6 percent  of GNP.  Only in  the last  two  years  covered  did this
ratio  begin  to increase  rapidly.
The analysis  of the  previous  sections  also  suggests  an important  reason
why the  actual  deficit  was  able to remain  as close  as it  did to its
equilibrium  value  over  the time  period  in question. Although  its  stocks  of
domestic  and  external  debt  were not  negligible  at the  beginning  of the
eighties,  the  goverrment  of Pakistan  was  able to  borrow  both  domestically
and externally  at rates  below  the  marginal  cost  of funds  in the  inter-
national  private  capical  market. Figure  7a shows  that  the  nominal  interest
rate  on domestic  debt  and  on external  debt  both remained  substantially  below
LIBOR  for  most of the  past decade. As a result,  Pakistan's  fiscal  deficit
attained  much lower  levels  than  would  have  been recorded  had all  debt
(domestic  and  foreign)  been serviced  at the  marginal  cost of funds  abroad,
given  by the  covered-interest  parity  condition  (LIBOR  plus the  expected  rate
of exchange-rate  depreciation). This  is demonstrated  in Panel  B of Figure
7, which  reproduces  Figure  6  except  for  the  inclusion  of ADJDEF,  the  deficit
ratio  adjusted  for  the  additional  debt  servicing  costs  that  would  have  been
implied  by financing  at external  private  capital  market  rates. Notice  that
the  adjusted  deficit  lies  everywhere  substantially  above  the  already-high
equilibrium  value.
As shown  in Figure  6, fiscal  deficits  after  1983  have  begun  to
substantially  exceed  the  equilibrium  values  calculated  for  1980-87.
Deficits  of such  magnitude  can  be expected  to  exert  significant  effects  on
financial  markets. However,  even these  higher  recent  deficits  have not  been- 28  -
Figure  7a
Interest  Rates on Domestic and External  Debt, 1980-81 to  1987-88
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associated  with  an  inflationary  upsurge.  An  explanation  for  this  is
suggested  in  Panel  A of  Figure  8,  which  shows  how  recent  deficLts  have  been
financed.  The  height  of  each  curve  in  Figure  8a  measures  the  amount  of
financing  from  specific  sources.  The  lowest  curve  measures  the  flow  of
external  financing,  the  second  curve  adds  to  this  domestic  financing,  while
the  third,  which  represents  the  total  deficit,  adds  money  financing.  As  is
evident  from  this  figure,  recent  years  have  witnessed  a rapid  increase  in
domestic  borrowing  (the  gap  between  the  lowest  curve  and  the  next  higher
one). As  a result,  while  the  ratios  of  base  money  and  external  debt  to  GNP
have  remained  roughly  stable,  that  of  domestic  debt  to  GDP  has  risen
noticeably  (Figure  8b). The  macroeconomic  effects  of  this  financing  policy
are  investigated  in  the  next  section.
In  summary,  why  has  the  simple  story  linking  fiscal  deficits  to
inflation  failed  to  hold  in  Pakistan?  Three  reasons  can  be  given:
a.  Reserve  money  represented  only  about  a  fifth  of  the  government
of  Pakistan's  total  interest-bearing  and  non-interest-bearing  debt  at  the
beginning  of  the  eighties.  This  stock  of  interest-bearing  debt  could  be
expanded  to  finance  fiscal  deficits  in  proportion  to  the  growth  of  the
economy  without  jeopardizing  the  public  sector's  solvency,  thus  severely
weakening  the  link  between  deficits  and  the  expansion  of  base  money.
b.  The  economy  grew  very  rapidly  indeed  during  the  eighties,  so  that
this  source  of  financing  in  fact  was  consistent  with  extremely  large  (by
international  standards)  equilibrium  deficits.
c.  Nonetheless,  the  deficits  actually  observed  in  Pakistan  would  have
exceeded  these  equilibrium  levels  except  for  the  fact  that  the  government- 30
Figure  8a.  Composition  of Deficit Financing,  1980-81 to  1987-88
(in  percent  of GNP) 9  ,..9
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Figure  8b.  Ratios  of  Base Money, Domestii: Debt
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was  able to  borrow,  both domestically  and  externally,  at rates  much lower
than  the  marginal  rates  prevailing  in private  international  capital  markets.
Thus,  imperfect  private  capital  mobility  and  access  to funds  at below-market
rates  from  official  creditors  made important  contributions  to  holding  down
the  rate  of inflation  in Pakistan.
IV.  The effects  of Fiscal  Policy  on Economic  Behavior
This section  examines  the  effects  of fiscal  policy  on the  behavior  of
economic  agents  in Pakistan. Recent  research  has shown  that  both the
investment  and  consumption  decisions  of economic  agents  may  be directly
affected  by policy  variables  such  as government  consumption  and  investment.
Such  decisions  also  are  known  to respond  to financial  variables  that  are
themselves  affected  by the  mode  of government  financing.
In  what follows  we shall  first  examine  the  behavior  of consumption  and
investment  in Pakistan,  and  then  present  some  estimates  of private
consumption  and investment  functions,  as  well as of an aggregate  production
function. Asset  demand  functions  are  presented  in subsection  5.  These
equations  are  then  combined  in Section  V with an output  growth  equation  to
produce  a simulation  model  that  is used to  produce  counterfactual
simulations  that  can  be employed  to assess  the  effects  of fiscal  policy.
1.  Consumption  and  Investment  in Pakistan
As shown  in  Section  I, total  investment  as a ratio  of GNP  has averaged
about  15  percent. Figure  9a shows  the  separate  behavior  of the  ratio  of
public  and private  investment  to  GNP  over the  period  1964-65  to 1986-87.
Apart  from the  strong  investment  drive  initiated  by the  Bhutto  government- 32  -
Figure  9.
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in 1973,  the  two  forms  of investment  tend  to  be positively  correlated.
Since  that  time the  private  investment  rate  has  not returned  to the  high
levels  that  it had  attained  at the  beginning  of the  period. Moreover,  since
1972-73  public  investment  has represented  the  bulk  of total  investment.
Whether  the  high level  of public  investment  has served  to  catalyze  private
investment  by means  of infrastructural  development  or whether  private
investment  has  been crowded  out is  an issue  that  will  be examined
econometrically  below.
Figure  9b shows  how  private  and  public  consumption  have  moved  as a
ratio  of GNP from 1963-64  to 1986-87. The first  significant  point  to note
is that Pakistan  has  exhibited  a fairly  high  average  propensity  to  consume:
the  ratio  of total  consumption  to  GNP has  averaged  about  85X  per annum  over
she  period. Ex ante,  the  high fiscal  deficit  may  be suspected  to  have
played  a role in  producing  this  result. However,  the  data also  suggests  an
underlying  relationship  between  public  and  private  consumption. As public
consumption  increases,  private  consumption  appears  to decline. Such
compensating  behavior  would  appear  to lend  credence  in the  case  of Pakis-.an
to the  Ricardian  view that there  is a tendency  for  aggregate  consumption  to
maintain  its  level,  regardless  of the  level  of public  consumption.  1/
2.  Consumption
The  estimation  of the  consumption  function  was conducted  with annual
data for  the  period  1963 to 1987  derived  from  various  issues  of the  Pakistan
Economic  Survey. We assume  that  consumption  can  be explained  by permanent
income,  disposable  income,  and  possibly  several  fiscal  variables  (public
1/  See  David  and  Scadding  (1974).- 34  -
consumption,  the  fiscal  deficit,  and/or  permanent  public  sector  saving).
Disposable  income  (yd)  is defined  as GNP  minus  total  tax  revenue,  while
public  sector  saving  (PBS)  is defined  as government  revenues  minus  current
expenditures,  which include  interest  payments  on government  debt.  Prelimi-
nary investigations  revealed  that  the  disposable  income  process  could  be
represented  by an ARiKA(l,l)  specification.  Consequently  permanent  income,
yP,  was generated  as the  predicted  value  of the  following  estimated
equation:
(5)  yp  - - 2730.86 +  1.07  yt1 d  .26[MA(l)]
R  - .99  dw  - 1.87
Before  proceeding  to  estimation  of the  consumption  function,  unit root
tests  were conducted  on the  aggregate  variables  that  were to  be included  in
the  consumption  function. All  such  variables  are in logs  and  are  converted
to per-capita  levels. Table 3  presents  the  results  of the  unit root tests
for  consumption,  disposable  income,  general  government  consumption,  the
public-sector  deficit,  permanent  income,  and the  permanent  public  sector
deficit. Test results  for  the  Durbin-Watson,  Dickey-Fuller,  and  the
Augmented  Dickey-Fuller  tests,  as  well as the  critical  values  for  tests,
are  presented  in the table. The  null  hypothesis  that  a unit  root is  present
was rejected  only in the  case  of the  public  sector  deficit  (by  the  Augmented
Dickey-Fuller  test). Since  the  presence  of unit  roots  in almost  all the
variables  suggests  that  conventional  estimation  approaches  may  yielda  35  -
misleading  results,  an alternative  approach,  which  resulted  in an error-
correction  specification,  was  used.
The  cointegrating  regression,  which  captures  long-run  equilibrium
relationships  between  consumption  and some  of its  determinants,  was based
on the  permanent  income  approach,  incorporating  both the  income  variables
mentioned  previously  and  intertemporal  relative  price  variables  such  as the
rate  of interest  and the  rate  of inflation. Additional  fiscal  policy
variables--as  indicated  above--were  also  included. Instrumental  variables
were used for  estimation  to contend  with endogeneity  issues. The
instruments  used included  the  lagged  values  of permanent  income,  the
govervi.  leficit,  government  consumption  and the  rate  of inflation. The
estimated  c<: cegrating  equation  is as follows:
(6)  cP  - 0.45  +  1.35  yP.  0.56 cg - 1.11  ff
t  t  t  t
(-0.41) (6.33) (-2.86)  (-2.83)
R  .93  dw  - 1.8
where  c4 is  private  consumption,  -P  is  permanent  income  obtained  using
equation  (5)  above,  and  cf is government  expenditure,  all  measured  in log  of
real  per-capita  terms,  while  if  is the  annual  inflation  rate  measured  by the
consumer  price  index. The equation  appears  to fit  well,  explaining  93X  of
the  variation  in the  log  of per-capita  private  consumption  and,  as the
Durbin-Watson  statistic  shows,  the  residuals  are  non-autocorrelated.  The
signs  and  magnitudes  of coefficients  are in  keeping  with economic  theory.
The coefficient  of permanent  income,  for  example,  is  not significantly- 36  -
different  from  unity. Increases  in  government  consumption  do  appear  to  lead
to  a reduction  ln  private  consumption,  as  do  increases  in  the  rate  of
inflation.  However,  we  could  not  find  significant  roles  for  the  other
fiscal  variables  listed  above,  nor  for  the  real  interest  rate.
Using  the  residuals  from  the  cointegrating  regression  above  as  the
error-correction  term  (denoted  ec),  an  error-correction  specification  of  the
consumption  function  produced  the  following  result:  1J/
acP  ~  .23 +  .19 AyP +  .58  dy  - .41 ac8 - .22 ec 1
(1.40) (1.10)  (2.45)  (-3.27)  (-1.67)
2 R  - .93  dw - 2.01
Instrumental  variables  included  the  error  correction  term,  government
consumption,  lagged  inflation,  lagged  disposable  income,  and  lagged
permanent  income.  Judging  by  the  usual  criteria  the  equation  seems  to  fit
well. The  error  correction  term,  ect.1,  is  significant  at  the  10 level,
suggesting  that  private  consumption  does  not  adjust  fully  to  its  long-run
desired  level  in  the  first  period.  Only  a fifth  of  the  total  adjustment  is
completed  in  the  first  year. The  negative  and  significant  coefficient  of
Ace  shows  that,  even  in  the  short  run,  lncreases  in  government  consumption
are  negatively  related  to  private  consumption.  The  coefficient  of  the
change  in  disposable  ineome  ls  positive  and  statistically  significant,
suggesting  that  consumption  behavior  may  be  lnfluenced  by  liquidity
constraints.
J/ See  DavLdson  at.  &I.  (1978).- 37  -
The evidence  therefore  suggests  that  fiscal  policy  may  have affected
private  consumption  in Pakistan  primarily  through  direct  substitutability
between  private  and  public  consumption,  through  tax  policy,  and through
indirect  effects  operating  through  macroeconomic  variables  such  as the  level
of real income  and the  rate  of inflation.
3.  Investment
Our  private  investment  equation  was estimated  using  annual  data for  the
period  1972-73  to 1987-88  from  the  Pakistan  Economic  Survev. Capital  stock
series  for  both the  public  and  private  sector,  denoted  kg  and  kIp respec-
t  t
tively,  were  constructed  using  an initial  (1971-72)  economy-wide  capital-
output  ratio  of two,  an initial  share  of 30  percent  for  the  public  capital
stock,  and  depreciation  rates  of 10  percent  overall  and  5 percent  for the
public  capital  stock. A rental  cost  of capital  (denoted  rk)  series  was
constructed  by dividing  the  product  of the  real  rate  of interest  and  the
investment  deflator  by the  CDP  deflator. We take  private  investment  in
Pakistan  to be determined  by the  sizes  of the  private  and public  capital
stocks,  the level  of real  output  and the  rental  rate  on capital.  ]/  Unit
root tests  vere again  conducted  for  the  level  variables  and are  presented  in
Table  4.  The tests  suggest  that  unit roots  cannot  be ruled  out  for  most of
the relevant  variables. Consequently,  the  approach  adopted  in thls  case  vas
similar  to that for  private  consumption. The  cointegrating  regression  was
estimated  as follows:
1J/  We could  find  no evidence  of a  credit  availability  effect,  ln spite  of
the  repressed  financial  conditions  prevailing  in the  economy  for  most of the
period.Table  4.  Tests  for  Unit  Roots: Investment  i/
Private  Government  Real
Capital  Capital  Rate  of  Real
Stock  Stock  Interest  Output
Tests  for  unit roots
Durbin-Watson  0.026  0.099  0.51  0.15
Dickey-Fuller  5.31  -1.74  -1.51  -0.29
Augmented  Dickey-Fuller  -1.41  -1.33  -0.65
J/ All  variables  are logs  of real  per  capita  values. Critical  values  for  the  CRDU  and the  Dickey-
Fuller  tests  are:
Durbin-Watsoii  1.1
Dickey-Fuller  -2.61- 39 -
(8)  K  p/Y  - 0.07  - 1.26  r  +  2.09  KG/Y - 0.09  DUM
(-  0.25)  (-5.33)  (3.78)  (-2.79)
R2  _  0.90  dw  _  2.26
where  DUM is a dummy  variable  for  the immediate  post-Bhutto  1977-81  period.
The  estimates  support  the  hypothesis  that  the  government  capital  stock
is  positively  correlated  with  private  sector  capital  accumulation. The
i.frastructural  buildup  that  results  from  government  investment  appears  to
facilitate  private  investment.  At the  same  time  an increased  real rental
cost  of capital  depresses  private  investment.  The remaining  variables  did
not  prove  to be statistically  significant.
Once again,  the  residuals  from  the  cointegrating  regression  were
used for  computing  the  tests  for  cointegration.  For  our  cointegrating
regression,  the  Cointegrating  Residuais  Durbin-Watson  (CRDW)  ,  the
Dickey-Fuller,  and  the  Augmented  Dickey-Fuller  statistics  were  estimated  to
be 1.8, -4.85,  and -3.93  respectively.  These  values  imply  that  the  null
hypothesis  of unit roots  in  the  residuals  can  be rejected  and thar  equation
(8)  is  a cointegrating  form.  Consequently,  an error-correction
specification  is  warranted  in this  case  as well.
The results  for  the  error-correction  estimation  were:  1J
A(K /Y)  - -0.02  -0.27  ec(-l)  + 0.90  a(K  G/Y) -0.11  Ar  -0.03  ADUM
(-4.10)(-1.53)  (1.94)  (-0.71)  (-2.20)
R2  _ 0.45  dw  - 1.64
1J  Instruments  used in the  estimation  induced  the  error  correction  term,
the  constant,  lagged  growth  rate,  the  ratio  of the  government  capital  stock
to  GDP. and the  time trend.- 40 -
This  equation  obviously  leaves  much  of  the  variation  in  the  ratio  of  the
capital  stock  to  output  unexplained,  and  some  of  the  individual  coefficients
are  not  estimated  very  precisaly.  The  coefficient  of  the  error  correction
term  ec. 1 suggests  that  the  private  capital  stock  adjusts  slowly  to  its
long-run  desired  level.  The  positive  and  significant  coefficient  of
a(Kf/yt)  indicates  that,  even  in  the  short  run,  an  increase  in  the
government  capital  stock,  or  a  positive  level  of  government  investment,
induces  an  increase  in  private  investment.  Consistent  with  the  theoretical
hypothesis,  the  rental  return  on  capital  is  negatively  related  to  private
investment.
Our  examination  of  investment  behavior.  therefore,  shows  that  fiscal
policy  has  both  direct  and  indirect  effects  on  private  investment  in
Pakistan.  The  direct  effect  would  appear  to  operate  by  expanding  domestic
infrastructure  through  public  investment.  More  indirect  effects  are
traceable  via  the  effects  of  fiscal  policy  interest  rates.
4.  QLuepu
To  complete  the  simulation  model  used  in  the  next  section,  a  speci-
fication  of  the  determinants  of  real  output  growth  is  required.  Production
is  assumed  to  follow  a  Cobb-Douglas  technology  with  three  inputs,  consisting
of  the  two  capital  stocks--government  and  private--and  labor.  Using
population  as  a proxy  for  labor  and  assuming  constant  returns  to  scale,  the
production  function  was  estimated  in  per  capita  form  as  follows:
(10)  y  - 5.838  +  .076 k8 +  .268  kP  +  .82  MA(l)
(17.732)  (2.304)  (13.048)  (3.842)
2 R  .9  dw  - 1.8741 -
As  expected,  the  coefficients  of  both  the  public  and  the  private  capital
stocks  are  significant  and  positive.  The  magnitudes  of  the  coefficients  are
also  reasonable,  suggesting  that  the  total  share  of  capital  in  output  is
about  30%,  leaving  70%  of  total  output  as  the  share  of  labor.
5.  The  Financial  Sector
In  order  to  model  the  domestic  financial  sector,  it  is  assumed  that  the
household  sector's  total  financial  assets  (denoted  A)  consist  of  domestic
currency  (C),  domestic  deposits  (D),  government  bonds  (BP),  and  foreign
currency  assets  (FP). Household  financial  wealth  (W)  therefore  consists  of
the  holdings  of  these  four  assets,  minus  household  debt  to  the  banking
system  (Lp ):
(11)  W  A  LCB
where:
(12)  A - C  +  D  + BP  +  sFP
Since  these  assets  are  substitutes  in  individual  portfolios,  individual
demand  for  each  asset  is  a  function  of  the  asset's  own  rate  of  return  as
well  as  of  the  returns  available  on  other  assess.  I/  Domestic  currency,
which  pays  no  interest,  is  demanded  for  transaction  purposes.  All  other
assets  are  assumed  to  be  held  for  portfolio  reasons.  The  total  size  of  the
portfolio  to  be  allocated  among  these  remaining  assets  thus  consists  of
financial  wealth  net  of  currency,  plus  credit  from  the  banking  system.  As
is  well  known,  in  this  framework  only  three  asset  demand  equations  need  be
I/  The  framework  used  is  a  variation  of  the  Tobin  (1970)  general-
equilibrium  approach.- 42  -
estimated,  since  the  adding-up  constraint  (12)  above  implies  the  properties
of the  remaining  equation. The  demand  for  currency  was  specified  as a
function  of the  nominal  interest  rate  on deposits--the  closest  substitute
for  currency--and  income  (real  GNP).  Demand  for  domestic  government  bonds
as a share  of the  allocatable  portfolio  was taken  to  be a function  of the
rate  of return  on those  bonds  as well  as those  on competing  assets--the
nominal  rate  of interest  on domestic  deposits  and the  return  on foreign
assets  (i.e.,  the  foreign  market  interest  rate  corrected  for  exchange-rate
changes). The  household  asset  demand  system  is completed  with a currency
substitution  equation  (in  which the  ratio  of  domestic  deposits  to foreign
currency-denominated  assets  is taken  to be a function  of the three  rates  of
return). This is equivalent  to the  alternative  approach  of estimating
either  the  demand  for  domestic  deposits  or foreign  currency  assets,  and
determining  the  remaining  demand  as a residual. The approach  adopted  here
was  preferred,  however,  because  of the  interest  in obtaining  direct
estimates  on currency  substitution  comparable  to those  existing  in  a wide
body  of empirical  literature.
The results  of the  estimations  for the  financial  sector  have  been
collected  in Table  5.  Both the  nominal  interest  rate  on deposits  and
income  are  significant  and  carry  the  expected  signs  in the  currency  demand
equation. Moreover,  as expected,  the  income  elasticity  is  close  to unity.
The  demand  for  government  bonds is  positively  and significantly  related  to
the  interest  rate  on those  bonds  and  negatively  related  to the  deposit
interest  rate.  Interestingly  enough,  deposit  interest  rates  do not
significantly  affect  the  demand  for  these  bonds  and  therefore  were droppedTable  5.  Financial  Asset  Demand  Functions  1/
Log  of the  Log  of the  Ratio
Log  of the  Ratio  Ratio  of  of Domestic
of Currency  in  Domestic  Public Deposits  to Foreign
Circulation  to  Wealth  Debt  to Wealth  Currency  Holdings
Interest  Rate  on Deposits  -0.079  0.271
(-5.21)  (5.098)
Interest  Rate  on Public  Sector  Debt  0.058
(2.186)
Interest  Rate on Foreign  Currency  Assets  _/  -0.002
(-0.354)
Log  of the  Ratio  of Income  (GNP)  to  Wealth  0.996
(3.875)
Exchange  Rate  Appreciation  -0.008
(-2.95)
Duumy  for  1970-1972  1.505
(4.67)
Lagged  dependent  variable  0.932
(5.787)
MA (1)  0.97
(3.962)
CONSTANT  -1.51.7  -0.464  1.635
(-1.373)  (-1.130)  (3.269)
R2  0.81  0.91  0.64
d-w  1.85  2.34  2.27
I/ t-ratios  in  parentheses.  a 0
j/  Libor  plus expected  exchange  rate  depreciation.- 44  -
from  the  equation. Strong  evidence  of partial  adjustment  behavior  was found
for  this  equation. In the  currency  substitution  equation  both the  deposit
rate  and the  expected  change  in the  exchange  rate  are significant  and  of the
right  sign.  However,  the  effect  of the  exchange  rate  change  is surprisingly
small. In the  deposit  equation  a dummy  variable  for  the  period  of the
Bangladesh  war  was found  to  be significant  and is therefore  included.
To investigate  the  indirect  effects  of fiscal  deficits  on the  real
sector  operating  through  the  financial  variables  described  above,  the  next
section  embeds  the  equations  just  estimated  into  a general  equilibrium
model.
V.  Policy  Simulations
The  previous  section  identified  several  direct  channels  through  which
fiscal  policy  may  have affected  macroeconomic  outcomes  in Pakistan. These
include  the  direct  crowding  out  of private  by public  consumption,  the
effects  of taxation  on  household  resources,  and the  effects  of increases  in
the  public  capital  stock  on economic  growth,  both  directly  and indirectly
through  a complementary  relationship  with private  investment.  The na.ure  of
these  relationships  suggests  one set  of reasons  why fiscal  deficits  may  not
have greatly  inhibited  Pakistan's  growth  performance--public  dissavinb  in
the  form  of  consumption  may  have  been in  part  offset  by private  saving,
thereby  limiting  the  claims  of the  former  on resources  for  investment.
Simultaneously,  public  investment  has itself  been  directly  productive  and'
may  have tended  to stimulate  private  investment.
These  relationships,  however,  are  only  part of the  picture. Not  only
are these  direct  channels  of influence  dynamic,  so that their  long-run- 45 -
implicatLons  may  differ  from  contemporaneous  effects  captured  ln regression
coefflcients,  but indirect  channels  of influence  must also  be taken  lnto
account. These  include,  in particular,  the  possibillty  of Ifinancial
crowding  out,"  as domestic  borrowing  to  finance  fiscal  deficlts  may tend  to
raise  domestic  interest  rates,  thereby  raising  the  rental  cost  of capLtal.
To capture  dynamic  effects  as well  as these  indirect  interactions,  in this
section  we analyze  counterfactual  scenarios  under  alternative  fiscal
policies,  with  a view to assessing  how the  Pakistanl  economy's  performance
would  have been affected  during  the  decade  of the  eighties  by various  forms
of flscal  adjustment.
The model  used for  the  simulations  embodies  the  behavioral  equatlons
estimated  in  Section  LV.  These  include  the  permanent  income  equation  (5),
the  consumption  function  (7),  a  private  investment  function  derived  from
(9),  the  growth  equation  (10),  and  a set  of financial  sector  equations
consisting  of identities  (11)  and (12)  as  well as the  three  asset  demand
functions  reported  in  Table  5.  The  model is  fleshed  out  with several
additional  identities. For  brevity,  these  are  reported  in  Table  6.
The  workings  of the  model  can  be described  as follows: publlc  sector
consumption,  investment  and tax  revenues  are  taken  to  be policy-determined
fiscal  variables.  I/  Monetary  pollcy  variables  consist  of the  supply  of
base money,  borrowing  by the  public  sector  from  the  commercial  banks,
lendlng  by the  central  bank to the  commercial  banks,  and  the  roquired
reserve  ratio.  In addLtion,  we shall  treat  public  external  borrowLng  as an
I/  ThLs assumes,  impllcitly,  that  tax  rates  are  adjusted  to  offset
deviations  in  the  tax  base  from  baseline  values.- 46  -
exogenous  variable.  As  can  be  seen  from  the  public  sector  budget  constraint
in  Table  6,  this  implies  that  domestic  nonbank  borrowing  becomes  the
residual  mode  of  financing  for  the  public  sector.  This  would  seem  to  be  the
appropriate  assumption  to  make  for  Pakistan  during  the  decade  of  the
eighties.
Two  other  policy  variables  deserve  mention.  Pakistan  maintained  a
system  of  administered  interest  rates  in  the  commercial  banking  system  until
July  1,  1985,  when  all  deposit  and  new  financing  operations  of  the  banks
were  placed  on  an  Islamic  noninterest  basis.  The  new  profit-loss  system
implied  a  move  toward  fairly  flexible,  market-related  rates  of  remuneration
for  deposits  and  charges  for  bank  loans.  However,  although  for  most  of  the
period  over  which  our  asset  demand  functions  were  estimated  bank  interest
rates  were  essentially  a  policy  instrument,  we  have  treated  them  as
endogenous  in  the  simulation  exercises.  Implicitly,  we  are  assuming  that
the  monetary  authorities  managed  these  interest  rates  so  as  to  maintain
financial  market  equilibrium.  In  fact,  these  rates  do  exhibit  substantial
year-to-year  variation  over  the  sample  period.
Finally,  Pakistan  maintained  a  fixed  exchange  regime  for  most  of  the
period  under  review.  In  1982,  this  regime  was  abandoned  in  favor  of  a
managed  exchange  rate,  under  which  the  authorities  have  undertaken  frequent
small  devaluations  of  the  rupee.  While  the  exchange  rate  has  been  managed
with  an  eye  on  the  effective  real  exchange  rate  of  the  rupee  (and  a
substantial  real  depreciation  has  been  achieved  since  1982),  price  stability
has  also  been  an  objective  of  the  authorities.  For  the  purpose  of  the- 47 -
Table  6.  Identities  for  the  Simulation  Model /
1.  Public  sector  budget  constraint
1-  H  + zB  %-  AF
AH +  AB + S&FG  + (ALCB  ALC)  - DEF
2.  Public  sector  deficit
DEF  - (C  + I* -T)P + iBB  + i  SFG  +i  iC  - CB  ) -1  -1  (L 0 LCB)
3.  Public  sector  capital  accumulation
K  - IG  +  (1  - 6  )  KG 1
. 1
Variables  not  previously  identified  are  defined  as follows:
FG  - foreign  debt  of the  public  sector
LCB  . commercial  bank lending  to the  public  sector
LG  - Central  bank lending  to  commercial  banks
CZB
H  - High-powered  money
B  - total  public  sector  securities  outstanding
DEF  - public  sector  deficit
IG  - public  investment
T  - taxes
iB  _  interest  rate  on public  sector  securities
iF  _  interest  rate  on foreign  debt
iCB  - commercial  bank lending  rate
rr  - reserve  ratio
yD  - household  disposable  income
Z  - foreign  remittances
6P  _  rate  of depreciation  on private  capital  stock
6G  _  rate  of depreciation  on public  capital  stock
pK  - price  of capital  goods
TB  - trade  balance
- fixed  positive  paramecer- 48  -
4.  Hiiuh.Dod  Mangy
H - C + rrD
5.  Commergial  banks'  balance  ghegt
CB  CB  BCB  +  G Li-(I  rr)D-  - 8Li  LB
6.  nesit  1  st  rate
D  CB I - (1/(1  *  rr))i
7.  Household  disoosable  incgMe
YD  - Y + Z  T  +  (iBP+SFP  +IDD  1CB  CB
8.  Household  budget  constraint
AV - (yD  _ C  _ IP)p  +  (S  - S  )P
9.  Pryvate  investment
IP  _  (KPy)Y  M  (1  - 6p)K
10.  Rental  cost of ca2itAl
rK  B  PBK  + 6P)pK/p
l ~  ~  ~  (  I+)/- 49 -
11.  Relative  2ricO  af capLtal
PK/P  - a
0
12.  EoullibriuM  condition  fer  public-sector  securities
B - BP + B-
13.  Trade  balance
TB - Y - C  - C  IP  I.  I50  -
simulations,  therefore,  we will treat  the  nominal  exchange  rate  as a  policy
instrument.
The  model is solved  as follows: at the  beginning  of each  period,  real
output  is a  predetermined  variable,  given  as a function  of the inherited
private  and  public  capital  stocks. Beginning-of-period  asset  stocks  are
also  predetermined,  since  they  are given  by last  period's  government
financing  decisions  and  private  sector  portfolio  allocations. The domestic-
currency  value  of the  private  sector's  stock  of foreign  assets,  however,  is
also  affected  by this  period's  official  exchange  rate.  For  these  assets  to
be  willingly  held, the  price  level  (which  affects  the  demand  for  currency),
the interest  rate  on public-sector  securities,  and the  deposit  interest
rate,  all  adjust  endogenously  to  achieve  equilibrium  levels. The interest
rate  on public  sector  securities,  in turn,  determines  the  rental  rate  on
capital. _/ This,  together  with  public  consumption  and investment
decisions,  as  well as other  contemporaneous  exogenous  determinants  of
private  disposable  income,  determine  private  consumption,  investment,  and
saving,  as well as the fiscal  deficit  and  the  trade  balance. Public  sector
financing  decisions  will then  determine  this  period's  increments  to the
domestic  components  of the  private  sector's  asset  portfolio  that  are to  be
carried  over to the  next period. The total  size  of the  portfolio  depends
on  private  saving  and the  amount  of lending  that  banks  are able  to make
available  to the  private  sector  after  satisfying  the  public  sector's
financing  needs. Any discrepancy  between  the  increase  in the  private
1/  The expected  rate  of inflation  is treated  as an exogenous  variable  in
these  simulations.- 51  -
sector's  portfolio  and  the  total  new  liabilities  issued  by the  public  sector
and the  banks  is accumulated  by the  private  sector  in the  form  of foreign
assets. With private  and  public  capital  stocks  determined  from this
period's  net investment  by the  respective  sectors,  next period's  output
becomes  determined  and  the  model  is  ready  to  be solved  again.
We have used'  this  model  to undertake  three  different  simulation
exercises. The first  concerns  an alternative  way  of financing  historical
fiscal  deficits,  while  the  remaining  two  consider  separate  deficit  reduction
scenarios.
In the  first  simulation,  we examine  the  macroeconomic  consequences  of
limiting  the  buildup  of domest.c  debt  by the  public  sector  after  1982-83  by
ircreasing  use of money  financing. Specifically,  we reduce  the  flow  of new
domestic  debt in each  year during  1983-84  to 1987-88  by 10  percent,  and
assign  the  role  of residual  financing  category  to the issuance  of base
money. The results  are  presented  in Charts  lOa  - lOf.
Chart  lOa  displays  the  variable  which  is shocked  in this  case,  the
stock  of public  sector  domestic  debt. Obviously,  reducing  the flow  of debt
by 10 percent  each  period  keeps  the  stock  of  debt  below  its  baseline  value,
but the  percentage  deviations  from  that  value  vary  over time.  Additional
money financing  would  have implied  larger  price  increases  than  historically
observed  (Chart  lOe).  On the  other  hand,  since  domestic  interest  rates
would  have been lower  (Chart  lOc),  private  investment  would  have increased
(Chart  10f),  and as a result,  real  GDP  would  have attained  higher  levels
(Chart  1Od).  Though  factor  income  would  have  been  higher,  lower  domestic
interest  rates  and  higher  prices  would  have  squeezed  private  disposable-52-
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lncome,  resulting  in  lower  private  consumption  (Chart  lOd). With  higher
output  and  lower  private  consumptlon,  the  trade  deficit  would  have  fallen,
in  spite  of  the  increase  in  private  lnvestment  (Chart  lOb). In  fact,  lower
debt  and  lower  interest  rates  would  have  implied  a lower  value  of  the  fiscal
deficit/GDP  ratio  itself.  In  short,  the  mode  of  financing  actually  chosen
seems  to  have  operated  as  intended  to  contain  the  price  level  consequences
of  the  deficit,  but  at  the  expense  of  somewhat  lower  investment--and
therefore  economic  growth--than  would  otherwise  have  been  observed.
Our  two  remaining  simulations  were  conducted  over  the  same  period,
but  consisted  of  a ten  percent  reduction  in  the  fiscal  deficit.  Debt
issuance  was  the  residual  mode  of  financing  (as  in  the  baseline)  in  these
simulatLons.  The  two  simulations  differ  from  each  other  in  how  the  deficit
reduction  is  brought  about. In  the  first,  a  reduction  in  public  sector
investment  is  contemplated,  while  in  the  second,  tax  revenue  is  increased.
Chart  lla  shows  that  reducing  the  deficit  by  10  percent  in  each  year
would  have  required  larger  and  larger  reductions  in  publlc  investment
relative  to  the  baseline.  As  is evLdent  from  Chart  lld,  this  would  have
implied  progressively  larger  reductions  ln  real  output,  both  because  of  the
lower  public  capital  stock  and  because  of  the  induced  decrease  in  the
private  capltal  stock,  slnce  the  smaller  public  capital  stock  would  have
depressed  private  investment  (Chart  llf). Crowdlng-in  through  lower
interest  rates  does  not  materiallze  in  this  case,  because  the  lower  public
capital  stock  represents  a  negatlve  supply  shock,  which  raises  prices  (Chart
Ile)  and  thus  actually  increases  the  domestic  lnterest  rate  (Chart  llc).
Reduced  output  and  higher  prlces  both  depress  prlvate  consumption  (ChartReduction  in Government  Deficit  through  a Reduction
in Government  Investment  Expenditure
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lid). However,  the  reductions  in  both  public  and  private  investment,
together  with  that  in  private  consumption,  do  succeed  in  improving  the  trade
balance,  (Chart  llb),  in  spite  of  the  lower  level  of  output.
Results  are  quite  different  when  the  deficit  reduction  is  brought  about
by  an  increase  in  tax  revenue.  In  this  case,  since  government  borrowing  is
reduced,  domestic  interest  rates  fall  (at  least  initially--see  Chart  12c),
and  this  stimulates  increased  private  investment  (Chart  12F). Because  of
the  increase  in  the  private  capital  stock,  real  GDP  is  somewhat  higher
(Chart  12d). But  higher  taxes  imply  lower  private  consumption  (Chart  12d).
Interestingly,  prices  r.Ji  in  this  scenario  (Chart  12e). The  reason  is  that
higher  taxes  reduce  private  disposable  income,  which  causes  private  saving
to  fall. Private  wealth  is  therefore  smaller,  but  since  money  financing  of
the  fiscal  deficit  is  exogenous,  the  stock  of  currency  increases  markedly  as
a  share  of  private  portfolios.  To  absorb  this  much  currency  willingly  into
private  portfolios  requires  an  increase  in  the  price  level.  This  in  turn
reinforces  the  effect  of  the  tax  increase  in  reducing  private  disposable
income  and  consumption.  This  decrease  in  private  consumption  again  leads  to
an improvement  in  the  trade  balance.  However,  as  domestic  prices  continue
to  rise,  the  interest  rate  reduction  is  eventually  reversed,  causing  private
investment  to  fall. While  this  magnifies  the  trade  balance  improvement,  it
cuts  off  the  positive  deviation  in  real  GDP  from  its  baseline  value.
Overall,  then,  the  macroeconomic  effects  of  Pakistan's  deficits  after
1983-84  depend  on  the  nature  of  the  counterfactual  fiscal  policy.  This
applies  both  to  how  the  deficit  reduction  would  have  been  brought  about  and
how  deficit  financing  would  have  been  altered.  It  appears  that  reducing  theReduction  in Government  Deficit  through  an Increase  in Taxes
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deficit  by cutting  public  investment,  which  has tended  to  be a favorite
vehicle  for  deficit  control  in Pakistan,  could  have  had favorable  trade
balance  effects,  but at a cost to economic  growth  and  with little  payoff  in
terms  of price  level  objectives. The alternative  favored  by many observers
-- an increase  in tax  revenues--could  achieve  a similar  external  adjustment
while  reducing  the  output  cost,  but may  also  have  problematic  price level
effects. In contrast,  the  effects  of altering  the  composition  of deficit
financing  appear  quite  conventional--shifting  to  more  money  financing  would
mean  higher  prices,  lower  interest  rates,  and  higher  growth.
VI.  SummarX  and  Conlusioans
The  underlying  causes  of Pakistan's  high fiscal  deficits  are not
dissimilar  from  those  in  other  developing  countries. These  deficits  reflect
explicit  policy  choices,  as well as  political  and  administrative  problems,
and they  were facilitated  by the  availability  of external  financing. Among
the  key  policy  decisions  contributing  to  Pakistan's  fiscal  performance
during  the  period  1972-73  to 1987-88  were the  declsions  by the  Bhutto
government  in the  early  seventies  to substantially  enlarge  the  role of the
public  sector  and  by subsequent  governments  in the  late  seventies  and  early
eighties  to  maintain  high levels  of both defense  spending  and  consumer
subsidles,  as well as to rely  heavlly  on nonbank  domestic  borrowing  as a
source  of finance  in the  eighties. A key  political  problem  has  been the
inability  to levy significant  taxes  on agriculture  during  all  of  this
period. Coupled  with the  administrative  difficulties  that  would  be posed  by
greater  reliance  on income  taxation,  this  has prevented  the  *mergence  of a
revenue  base to finance  the  chosen  expenditure  levels. Nevertheless,  the- 61  -
ready  availability  of external  finance  at concessionary  rates  has permitted
the resulting  deficits  to  be financed  without  a  fiscal  explosion.
As has  been emphasized  throughout  the  chapter,  however,  a distinctive
feature  of the  Pakistani  experience  has  been the  coexistence  of very large
fiscal  deficits  for  long  periods  of time  with  an economic  performance  that
has been relatively  satisfactory  %nd  crisis-free  with respect  to growth.
inflation,  and  the  external  accounts. To some  extent,  growth  has itself
accounted  for  this,  since  the  associated  expansion  of the  base for  both
conventional  taxes  and  seignorage  has  made it  possible  to finance
"equilibrium"  deficits  that  are  significantly  larger  than  would  have been
possible  to  finance  in  a slow-growth  economy.
Nevertheless,  since  the  early  eighties  fiscal  deficits  in Pakistan  have
clearly  exceeded  such  equilibrium  values. These  deficits  have been financed
by recourse  to  domestic  nonbank  borrowing,  resulting  in increasing  ratios  of
domestic  public  debt to  GNP and to  rising  interest  rates  on such debt.  Our
simulations  have indicated  that,  while  relying  on this  source  of finance  may
have mitigated  the  inflationary  consequences  of the  defLcits,  this  has  been
done at the  expense  of some  crowding  out  of private  Investment  and  has thus
implied  slower  growth  than  would  otherwise  have  been observed. Controlling
the  deficit  over this  period  would  have  contributed  to  more favorable
macroeconomic  outcomes--at  least  with respect  to  growth  and  the external
accounts--but  not if the  deficit  reduction  would  have  been  brought  about  in
a  manner  commonly  relied  upon  both in Pakistan  and  elsewhere--i.e.,  through
reducing  public  investment.- 63  -
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